Multiple Instances Of Cross-site Scripting In Viprinet Multichannel VPN Router 300
The data supplied to both the `old’ and `new’ web applications (the device has two web based management interfaces) was permanently stored and could be retrieved later by other users. This is a normal feature of many applications, however, in this instance the application failed to restrict the type of data that could be stored and also failed to sanitise it, meaning that it could not be safely rendered by the browser. Stored cross-site scripting could be triggered by attempting to login with a username of `<script>alert(1)</script>’ (affects `old’ interface and results in post-authentication cross-site Scripting when a legitimate administrator views the realtime log), creating an account with a username of `<script>alert(1)</script>’ (affects both `old’ and `new’ interfaces once created) and setting the device’s hostname to `<script>alert(1)</script>’ (affects `old’ interface once created). A number of locations were identified as being vulnerable to reflective attacks, including http://<host>/exec?module=config&sessionid=<sessionid>&inspect=%3Cscript%20src=http://localhost:9090%3E%3C/script%3E, http://<host>/exec?tool=atcommands&sessionid=<sessionid>&sourceobject=WANINTERFACELIST.OBJECT__0&module=configtools&commands=%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C%2Fscript%3E and http://<host>/exec?tool=ping&sessionid=<sessionid>&sourceobject=WANINTERFACELIST.OBJECT__0&module=configtools&host=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&pingcount=3&databytes=56. The inclusion of session IDs in all URLs partially mitigates the reflective cross-site scripting but could itself be considered a vulnerability since it is included in referred headers and log files.
