Security Advisory
Issues with the H.225 RAS implementation in TANDBERG Codecs have been confirmed when FIPS140 Mode is set to active. For the DoS to affect that Tandberg, H.323 Gatekeeper mode must be set to 'On' or 'Auto' as opposed to off. The Tandberg Endpoint does not have to be registered with a gatekeeper. The DoS is simply sending a RAS URQ request >3280 times. The Tandberg endpoint will swiftly run out of memory to process the request and subsequently reboot. The packet repetition amount required to crash depends on how many other legitimate requests the Endpoint is holding in its stack, if the tester wishes for clean results she/he may wish to reboot the Endpoint before running the PoC. However it is difficult to fit in any payload after the crashing packet (in a live remote exploit)as the person attempting this would have no control over what is already in the Endpoint network stack but due to the nature of video conferencing. This DoS would be effective on a large number of Endpoints that are on public IP. It is quite possible that the routed Endpoints(traversal, NAT, Port Forwarding) would allow this packet through as it is seemingly legitimate(most VC Network Admins set up Deep Packet Inspection exclusions to the VC Endpoints due to the nature of RTP, which in TCPDUMP looks like a UDP flood anyway)